Masalah dalam Penulisan Sejarah Thailand Masa Kini

Patrick Jory


Ada periode-periode tertentu ketika wacana-wacana sejarah dan politiknya – siapa yang mengendalikannya, cara-cara penyebarannya, bagaimana sejarah yang bertentangan ditekan – menjadi titik pusat perdebatan intelektual dan umum. Di Thailand hal tersebut telah terjadi beberapa waktu lalu sejak sejarah menimbulkan kegusaran terhadap berbagai kepentingan tadi. Penulisan sejarah nasionalis tampaknya telah mencapai posisi kuat (hegemoni) hingga tidaklah luar biasa jika mendapatkan sedikit oposisi. Kemudian, sebagaimana amankah upaya politik dan ilmiah tersebut setelah seratus tahun didirikan?


Dalam tulisan ini saya melihat pada sejumlah masalah pada penulisan sejarah nasionalis Thai. Pertama adalah masalah subyek wacana tersebut, bangsa Thai. Bagaimanakah penulisan sejarah bangsa Thai yang baik, khususnya sejak munculnya kritik atas konsep “bangsa” pada 1980-an oleh karya Anderson dalam Imagined Communities dan Hobsbawn dan Ranger dalam karya mereka The Invention of Tradition? Kedua, apa peran kerajaan dalam wacana tersebut? Bagaimanakah pengaruh politik dan budaya kerajaan saat ini membatasi kemungkinan penulisan sejarah Thai? Masalah ketiga adalah keterwakilan minoritas dari segi etnik dan minoritas, yang menantang pemahaman sebelumnya yang menerima begitu saja kesatuan bangsa dan keseragaman budaya.


Satu isyu baru, muncul sejak regionalisasi pada 1990-an, adalah pengaruh dari penulisan sejarah nasionalis Thai – seperti yang ditampilkan dalam drama televisi dan film, sebagaimana juga pada buku teks di sekolah-sekolah – terhadap hubungan Thailand dengan negara-negara tetangganya, yang dalam kasus tertentu menimbulkan ketegangan diplomatik. Masalah berikut menyangkut terutama sekali kepada sejarawan profesional dalam dunia akademik: pengaruh teori “pasca-modern” sejak 1990-an dan kemampuannya untuk meruntuhkan klaim kebenaran sejarah. Jika sejarah Thai adalah sederhana di antara sejarah yang tak terhitung dengan tidak mengklaim keunggulan atas atas masa lalu, apakah mereka berhak atas status istimewa? Keadaan yang menyulitkan adalah keberadaan sejarawan profesional saat ini yang hampir tak begitu penting atas atas cara pemahaman sejarah secara populer. Bagaimana kejatuhan disiplin sejarah secara kelembagaan, universitas dan lembaga pendidikan, mempengaruhi usia 100 tahun keturunannya, cerita bangsa Thai?


from :Kyoto Review

Penelitian Mengenai Trafficking Manusia di Daratan Asia Tenggara

Supang Chantavanich
The Migration of Thai Women to Germany: Causes, Living Conditions and Impacts for Thailand and Germany
(Migrasi Perempuan Thai ke Jerman: Sebab, Kondisi Kehidupan dan Dampak terhadap Thailand dan Jerman)
Supang Chantavanich, Suteera Nittayananta, Prapairat Ratanaolan-Mix, Pataya Ruenkaew and Anchalee Khemkrut
Bangkok / Asian Research Center for Migration, Chulalongkorn University / 2001

Chinese Women in the Thai Sex Trade
(Perempuan Cina dalam Perdagangan Seks di Thailand)
Vorasakdi Mahatdhanobol. Translated by Aaron Stern, edited by Pornpimon Trichot
Bangkok / Chinese Studies Center, Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 1998

“Pitfalls and Problems in the Search for a Better Life: Thai Migrant Workers in Japan”
(Perangkan dan Masalah dalam Mencari Kehidupan Lebih Baik: Pekerja Migran Thai di Jepang)
Phannee Chunjitkaruna
Dalam Thai Migrant Workers in East and Southeast Asia 1996-1997
(Pekerja Migran Thai di Asia Timur dan Asia Tenggara)
Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, and Allan Beesey, editors
Bangkok / The Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 2000

Thailand-Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Thailand-Myanmar Border Areas: Trafficking in Children into the Worst Forms of Child Labour. A Rapid Assessment
(Perbatasan Thailand-Laos dan Thailand-Myanmar: Trafficking atas Anak-anak kedalam Bentuk Buruk Pekerja Anak: Penilaian Cepat)
Christina Wille
Geneva / International Labour Organization / 2001
Dapat dibaca: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/library/pub1.htm

Small Dreams Beyond Reach: The Lives of Migrant Children and Youth Along the Borders of China, Myanmar and Thailand
(Mimpi yang Sulit Dicapai: Kehidupan Anak dan Pemuda Migran di Sepanjang Perbatan Cina, Myanmar dan Thailand)
Therese M. Caouette
A Participatory Action Research Project of Save the Children (UK) and the UK Department for International Development / 2001
Dapat dibaca: http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/labour/small%20dreams%20beyond%20reach.pdf

“Return and Reintegration: Female Migrations from Yunnan to Thailand”
(Kembali dan Reintegrasi: Migrasi Perempuan dari Yunnan ke Thailand)
Allan Beesey
Dalam Female Labour Migration in South-East Asia: Change and Continuity
(Migrasi Pekerja Perempuan di Asia Tenggara: Perubahan dan Keberlanjutan)
Supang Chantavanich, Christina Wille, Kannika Angsuthanasombat, Maruja MB Asis, Allan Beesey, and Sukamdi, editors
Bangkok / Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 2001





Trafficking manusia dari daratan Asia Tenggara pada periode modern dimulai sejak 1960-an berkaitan dengan kehadiran tentara Amerika Serikat di Indocina. Setelah tentara Amerika Serikat keluar dari Indocina pada 1975, banyak perempuan yang tetap berada pada perdagangan seks in Thailand; yang lainnya mulai bekerja di luar negeri, khususnya Jerman, Skandinavia, Hong Kong, dan Jepang. Agen-agen memfasilitasi migrasi dan lapangan pekerjaan perempuan tersebut melalui “jaringan antarbangsa trafficking manusia.” Masalah kuncinya adalah ketidakmampuan perempuan migran mengantisipasi dan mengendalikan kondisi tenaga mereka.


Bukti riset mutakhir mengenai trafficking manusia dan migrasi tidak teratur di Asia Tenggara menggambarkan beberapa “pergeseran.” Pergeseran ini bisa dilihat perekrut, penyedia jasa transpor, proses traffikcking, dan jenis eksploitasi di tempat tujuan.


Perekrutan: Jika perekrutnya cukup dikenal – seperti saudara dan teman dekat – tidak akan berakhir dengan trafficking manusia. Penggunaan kekuatan, penculikan, pengambilan paksa, dan paksaan sudah sangat berkurang. Dalam banyak kasus, pihak yang hendak melakukan trafficking mendekati perekrut untuk mencari keterangan mengenai migrasi. Pemakaian keterangan palsu mengenai pekerjaan dan kondisi kerja menjadi lebih sering diidentifikasi.


Trafficking: penyedia jasa transportasi adalah fasilitator bagi migran pelintas-batas yang ingin menghindari aturan imigrasi yang ketat dan rumit. Penyelundupan manusia merupakan terminologi yang tepat karena migran secara sukarela menyediakan diri. Tampaknya cara transportasi tidak begitu penting ketimbang melintasbatas or memotong kontrol imigrasi. Jaringan trafficking memiliki koordinasi secara horisontal di sepanjang perbatasan dalam operasi mereka. Pemakaian dokumen palsu sering ditemukan. Tujuan populer trafficking adalah lokasi-lokasi yang kontrol imigrasinya lemah dan ada banyak migran yang pergi ke sana.


Eksploitasi: selain eksploitasi seksual, perbudakan atau tpembayaran utang, orang yang di-trafficking menghadapi masalah berupa kurungan, pengambilan paksa dokumen, penangkapan dan pemerasan, lembur paksa, dan kondisi kehidupan yang berat, miskin, sesak, tak aman dan kasar. Perbudakan dan penghilangan organ manusia tidak ditemukan. Trafficking atas gadis, perempuan muda yang siap menikah, termasuk juga kegiatan yang terjadi di dalam rumah seperti trafficking atas bayi dan anak kecil juga dapat diidentifikasi. Juga sangat penting untuk dicatat bahwa jumlah perempuan yang sukarela dan mengetahui akibat bermigran untuk perdagangan seks meningkat dan biasanya mereka menjadi korban kembali. Korban yang bisa diidentifikasi biasanya tak mau dibantu dan dikirim pulang ke negeri asal.


from :Kyoto Review

Bagong Pananaliksik sa Pagtatrapik sa Tao sa Punong-lupang Timog-silangang Asya

Supang Chantavanich
The Migration of Thai Women to Germany: Causes, Living Conditions and Impacts for Thailand and Germany
(Ang Migrasyon ng mga Kababaihang Thai sa Alemanya: Mga Sanhi, Kalagayang Pangkabuhayan at Epekto sa Thailand at Alemanya)
Supang Chantavanich, Suteera Nittayananta, Prapairat Ratanaolan-Mix, Pataya Ruenkaew and Anchalee Khemkrut
Bangkok / Asian Research Center for Migration, Chulalongkorn University / 2001

Chinese Women in the Thai Sex Trade
(Mga Kababaihang Tsino sa Thai Sex Trade)
Vorasakdi Mahatdhanobol. Translated by Aaron Stern, edited by Pornpimon Trichot
Bangkok / Chinese Studies Center, Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 1998

“Pitfalls and Problems in the Search for a Better Life: Thai Migrant Workers in Japan”
(Mga Peligro at Problema sa Paghahanap ng Mas Mabuting Buhay: Mga Migranteng Manggagawang Thai sa Hapon)
Phannee Chunjitkaruna
Sa Thai Migrant Workers in East and Southeast Asia 1996-1997
Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, and Allan Beesey, editors
Bangkok / The Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 2000

Thailand-Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Thailand-Myanmar Border Areas: Trafficking in Children into the Worst Forms of Child Labour. A Rapid Assessment
(Ang Hangganan ng Demokratikong Republikang Thailand-Lao at Thailand-Myanmar: Ang Pagbebenta sa mga Bata sa Pinakamasamang Uri ng Child Labor: Isang Pahapyaw na Pagtatasa)
Christina Wille
Geneva / International Labour Organization / 2001
Basahin onlayn sa: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/library/pub1.htm

Small Dreams Beyond Reach: The Lives of Migrant Children and Youth Along the Borders of China, Myanmar and Thailand
(Mga Munting Pangarap na Di-maabot: Ang Buhay ng mga Migranteng Kabataan sa mga Hangganan ng Tsina, Myanmar at Thailand)
Therese M. Caouette
A Participatory Action Research Project of Save the Children (UK) and the UK Department for International Development / 2001
Basahin onlayn sa: http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/labour/small%20dreams%20beyond%20reach.pdf

“Return and Reintegration: Female Migrations from Yunnan to Thailand”
Allan Beesey
(Pagbabalik at Reintegrasyon: Mga Migrasyon ng Kababaihan mula Yunnan Patungong Thailand)
Sa Female Labour Migration in South-East Asia: Change and Continuity
Supang Chantavanich, Christina Wille, Kannika Angsuthanasombat, Maruja MB Asis, Allan Beesey, and Sukamdi, editors
Bangkok / Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 2001




Ang pagtatrapik sa tao mula sa punong-lupang Timog-silangang Asya sa kasalukuyang panahon ay nagsimula noong dekada 60 kaugnay ng pagkakaroon ng tropang Amerikano sa Indotsina. Matapos ang pag-alis ng mga pwersang-E.U. sa Indotsina noong 1975, ang ilang mga babae ay nanatili sa sex trade sa Thailand; ang iba naman ay nagsimulang magtrabaho sa ibang mga bansa, partikular sa Alemanya, Scandinavia, Hong Kong, at Hapon. Pinadali ng mga ahente ang migrasyon at pagpapatrabaho sa mga babae sa pamamagitan ng “international human trafficking networks.” Isang susing problema ay ang kawalan ng kapangyarihan ng mga babaeng migrante na malaman nang maaga at mapanghawakan ang kanilang kalagayang-panggawa.


Ang mga ebidensya mula sa bagong pananaliksik hinggil sa pagtatrapik sa tao at di-regular na migrasyon sa Timog-silangang Asya ay nagpapakita ng bahagyang “shift” sa konsepto ng pagtatrapik. Ang “shift” na ito ay maoobserbahan sa katangian ng mga rekruter at tagahatid, ang proseso ng pagtatrapik, at ang pagsasamantala pagdating sa destinasyon.


Pagrekluta: Nalaman na mayroong mga maaasahang rekruter – mga kapatid at malapit na kaibigan – na ang serbisyo ay hindi nagreresulta sa pagtatrapik. Ang paggamit sa dahas, pagkidnap, pagpilit, at pagtangay na lamang ay hindi na karaniwan. Sa maraming pagkakataon, ang mga biktima ay lumalapit sa mga rekruter para humingi ng impormasyon hinggil sa migrasyon. Subalit ang paggamit ng maling impormasyon hinggil sa trabaho at kalagayang-paggawa ay mas madaling natutukoy.


Pagtatrapik: Ang mga tagahatid ay tumutulong sa mga migrante na nais makaiwas sa mga mahigpit at masalimuot na regulasyon sa imigrasyon. “Human smuggling” ang masasabing ginagawa ng mga tagahatid na ito sa panahong parami nang parami ang mga migranteng boluntaryong nagpapatrapik. Maaring tignan na ang paraan ng paglalakbay ay hindi kasinghalaga ng pagtawid sa hangganan o pagpuslit sa kontrol sa imigrasyon. Ang mga network sa pagtatrapik ay mayroong koordinasyong tumatawid ng mga hangganan sa kanilang operasyon. Ang paggamit sa mga pekeng papeles panlakbay ay karaniwan. Ang mga popular na destinasyon para sa pagtatrapik ay ang mga lugar kung saan ang kontrol sa imigrasyon ay mahina at kakaunti lamang ang mga migranteng bumababa.


Pagsasamantala: Maliban sa pagkaalipin dahil sa utang o debt bondage at pagsasamantalang sekswal, ang mga taong itrinapik ay nakakaranas ng iligal na pagkakapiit, kumpiskasyon ng mga papeles, pagkaaresto at ekstorsyon, sapilitang pagtrabaho nang labis sa oras, at mahirap, masikip at marahas na kalagayan sa buhay. Walang mga kaso ng pang-aalipin at pagtanggal ng organo ng tao. Natutukoy naman ang pagtrapik sa mga batang babae para sa kasal at domestikong paggawa, gayundin ang sa mga sanggol at paslit. Mahalagang bigyang-pansin din ang pagdami ng mga kaso ng mga kababaihang boluntaryo at buong-kaalamang lumuluwas para sa sex trade at muling nabibiktima. Ang mga natutukoy na biktima ay ayaw magpatulong para makauwi.

from : Kyoto Review

Will the Mekong Survive Globalization?

Charnvit Kasetsiri


The Mystery of the Mekong River


During the cool and dry season of 2001, I sailed down the Mekong River on a 200-kilometer journey beginning in southern China, passing through Burmese and Lao territory on my right and left – a designated economic quadrangle “which has not yet succeeded in becoming a hub of economic activities” – eventually reaching the Golden Triangle in Chiang Saen district of Chiang Rai province, Thailand.


The journey began with a flight from Bangkok to Kunming and on to Yunnan’s Chiang Rung (Jinghong), the “city of dawn” (not “rainbow city” as many Thais have it). There, at Sipsongpanna (Xixuangbanna), home of the Tai ethnie – Tai without the “h” of the nationalistic Thai – we encountered Tai and Tai Lue people who were becoming somewhat Sinicized. The next day, we boarded a bus at three a.m. and one hour later were riding uphill through the mountains to the border of the Chinese Empire. Fog was so thick that the road was invisible, sparing us the fright of watching the cliff that dropped off beside us! An 11-hour ferry ride still lay ahead before we reached Chiang Saen at 8 p.m. I must confess this to be one of the most memorable journeys of my life.


In the past few years, the Mekong River has become a very popular academic seminar topic. Both western and Japanese researchers flock to university meetings in Chiang Mai, Khon Kaen, and Ubon, and at Chulalongkorn and Thammasat universities, scrambling in a search of competent counterparts to join in multi-million baht research projects.


This climate of excitement led me to peruse many books on the Mekong before I began my own exploratory voyage from Chiang Rung to Chiang Saen. One that caught my attention was “The Mekong River Handbook” (in Thai), published by the Office of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Thailand in 1973. Probably written under the guidance of American intelligence, which was actively fighting the “thirty years war” in Indochina, the book originated in the context of Cold War security concerns and was classified “for official use only.” It contains pictures and information about Thai provinces along the river as well as rare information about the other bank in Laos. Because it was published prior to Thailand’s tumultuous revolt of October 14, 1973, and before the US was defeated in Indochina in 1975, the book’s greatest relevance was probably to the Thai military’s crackdown on Communists.


Interestingly, the opening chapter of the book refers to the Mekong as “mysterious.” Was the river deemed mysterious because its source was in Tibet, a high plateau at the top of the world but under the rule of Communist China? During the Cold War, matters relating to any subject behind the “bamboo curtain” tended to be shrouded in mystery, darkness, and fear. The book concluded, partly in error, that there had never been an exploration that sought to map the river completely.


Prior to American hegemony, this area was under the influence of the Chinese, the French, and the British. To them, the river would not have been “mysterious.” It might have been so for the Americans, however, and perhaps for their Thai ally, both of whom who came to the area much later. When the United States followed the European path of imperialism, it went only so far as to colonize the periphery of Southeast Asia – the Philippines. The Mekong was still beyond America’s reach.


The same observation could be made of Siam. It is probable that those in the central region (Bangkok) knew very little about the Mekong area. To the central Thai, the Mekong was culturally and linguistically Lao. But the mighty Mekong did not seem so alien to those in the north and northeast such as in Lanna (Chiang Mai) and Lan Xang (Luang Phrabang and Wiangchan) or for those further south and east, such as the Khmer and Vietnamese.


New Information on the Mekong River


We can identify three special characteristics of the Mekong River: its size and length; its rich natural resources; and the ethnic diversity found along its banks.


Cartographically, one can see that the Mekong flows from the Tibetan high plateau north of Dali, a town near what was once the Nanchao Empire. (Incidentally, many Thais used to believe that Nanchao was an original Tai kingdom, supporting the idea that before Sukhothai-Ayutthaya-Bangkok, we must have come from southern China.)


According to old statistics, the Mekong River is 4,809 kilometers long, or the 12th longest river in the world. However, recent Chinese claims make it 100 kilometers longer. One of the latest findings, using remote-sensing technology, by Liu Shao Chuang of the Institute of Remote Sensing Application, in collaboration with the Chinese Academy of Science, has determined that the source of the Mekong (in common with the Yangtze River) is in the Jifu mountain range in Yushu Autonomous Region, 5,200 meters above sea level. Mr. Liu calculates that 2,198 kilometers of Mekong’s 4,909 kilometers is inside the Chinese border, where it is called the Lan Xang (Lancangjiang).


At any rate, the Mekong is clearly enormous and by far the longest river in Southeast Asia. It is an international river, flowing through the six nation-states of China, Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Its basin covers an area of 810,000 sq. km., or almost double the size of Thailand. This explains why the Mekong is a favorite of natural scientists and geographers, not to mention those fond of a well-known whisky that shares its name. (A Google search of the keyword “Mekong River” yields 83,000 listings.) Geographers say the Songkhla Lake (Thalesap Songkhla) in Southern Thailand is in fact a child of the Mekong. Mud sediment from the Tibetan plateau swept down through Vietnam and crossed to the Gulf of Thailand to form a mud wall, creating the lovely lake of Songkhla. This is something only short of a miracle!


Turning to the second point – natural resources – we need only note the keenness of economists, capitalists, developers, and others touting “mega-projects” to register the Mekong’s richness. The Mekong river basin hosts rich forests along both banks, and in Laos gold ore is being mined. It is a home to rare aquatic and non-aquatic animals such as the giant catfish, the world’s largest freshwater fish, as well as the river dolphin. In this it is second only to the Amazon River. For its rich natural resources, the Mekong has attracted European “colonializers” in the past and American “globalizers” and their colleagues in the present.


The third characteristic of the Mekong is the ethnic diversity that makes it a “heaven” as well as a “haven” for anthropologists. With 100 million people along its banks – 200 million if one stretches the definition of a riverbank – an anthropologist can spend a whole life immersed in any number of traditional (or tribal) societies. Historians, naturalists, ecologists, and NGOs are also attracted by the Mekong as a subject of study, a target for aid and assistance, or a source of quick profits.


All three characteristics – the Mekong’s reach, resources, and people – explain why the Chinese government has expressed interest in developing the river after several historical attempts by France failed. China set up an office for the development of the Lan Xang (Lancangjiang)/Mekong River in 1994. In April 2000, an agreement of free passage along the river was signed by China, Laos, Burma, and Thailand. Ferry service was inaugurated two years ago, which prompted the blasting of many of the Mekong’s rapids that block the route. This development has led to conflict over the use of natural resources.


What’s in a Name?


Let us for a minute pretend that we are not government officials or academics but rural villagers. Now, the river to us would be a source of livelihood and we may not be aware that the very same river we use daily originates in Tibet and flows out to the sea in Vietnam.


Before the river was called the “Mekong” all the way from its source to its end, people in China called it the Lan Xang (Lancangjiang) River. In Tibet (if you consider Tibet a separate socio-political entity from China), the name was Dzachu, which means “River of Rocks.” I’m not sure if the term Lan Xang is broadly used. It may be an old name that eventually became the name of a kingdom in Laos – perhaps like York in England, which gave birth to New York in the United States.


In old Lao-Tai languages (not modern Thailand’s Thai), the name “Nam Khong” (น้ำของ) for the mighty Mekong is commonly used. It happens to be the name of the district called Chiang Khong (เชียงของ) in Chiang Rai province. Somehow the “h” in Khong disappeared, just as it did in the name of the whisky Mekong (แม่โขง). Therefore, it is possible that the word Khong (ของ) is the oldest name for the river as far as the Lao-Tai are concerned.


We do not know the origin of the word “khong” or “kong,” but when considering folk culture, one may liken its sound to that of “khe” (ai khe, ai khong), meaning some kind of crocodile. From the point of view of royal culture, however, the word “khong” suggests a creolized form of Ganga or Ganges, the holy river in India, known as Khongkha (คงคา) in Thai.


Once the Mekong enters Cambodia it becomes the “Tonle Thom,” literally large river, and as it flows into Vietnam it acquires yet another name, “Gao Long” or nine dragons, giving Vietnam one of the world’s most fertile deltas for rice cultivation. Despite all this diversity, there is but one spelling of the river’s name in English.


Henri Mouhot and the Mekong “Craze” under French Colonialism


Any real traveler in the region cannot fail to have come across the name of Henri Mouhot, the French naturalist-cum-explorer, who between 1858 and 1861 obtained the support of the British to explore Siam, Laos, and Cambodia. This period was in the reign of King Mongkut, Rama IV, when Cambodia was a tributary state of Siam. (The Cambodians also sent tribute to the Vietnamese Emperor in Hue.)


Mouhot explored the central Mekong region – he was dubbed “the discoverer of Angkor” – and eventually came to Bangkok via Singapore (see his Travel in Siam, Cambodia, and Laos 1858-1860). Although Mouhot died at the age of 35, inspiring the phrase “see Angkor and die,” the success of his explorations led to Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom being named “great wonders of the East” (the term “Southeast Asia” having yet to be coined). It also led to great interest in the region among the French, who eventually colonized Indochina. Coming late to the Far East as a colonial power, they took the southern part of present-day Vietnam only in 1862. France later convinced King Narodom (the great-grandfather of the present Cambodian king) to end his country’s tributary status under Siam to become a French protectorate instead.


In this colonial milieu, France’s unhidden agenda was to use the Mekong as a “backdoor” into China. In fact, the French and British differed little from their present-day counterparts – led now by American corporations – in their mission to expand markets for their industrial products. The huge Chinese population buying their goods is what they dreamt about. How much profit could be made if every Chinese person bought one pen, one pair of shoes, or one hamburger?


In 1866, after colonizing Cambodia, Paris sent a full survey team up the Mekong to China. The British, who sought China’s “backdoor” via the Irrawaddy, satirically tagged the French survey team la monomanie du Mekong, or crazy about the Mekong. The expedition was led by the famous naval commander Dudart de Lagree.


This French expedition was very important. Dudart de Lagree was himself the French representative in South Vietnam, had visited Angkor, and was quite familiar with the region. His expedition consisted of 10 French officers, including Francis Garnier. Garnier’s name is known in Southeast Asian history as someone who was truly “mad” to defeat his British rivals. (He was later killed in Hanoi by Vietnamese nationalists.) Apart from militarists, botanists, and geologists, the expedition also included a photographer and the artist Louis Delaporte, who produced excellent photos and sketches during the trip.


The expedition set off from Saigon. It stopped to explore and photograph Angkor before passing through Vientiane, which had been abandoned and reclaimed by the jungle since the 1826 war against Siam. In Luang Phrabang the explorers were warmly welcomed by Laotian monarch King Chantharacha. Here they were warned not to proceed to China because of a looming peasant rebellion. But the warning did not stop them from continuing their trip up the river through the borderlands of Burma, Laos, and Siam, a region known today by the touristy name Golden Triangle. By the time the expedition reached southern China, Dudart de Lagree had died of illness. He was replaced by Garnier, who led the expedition to Dali where he ended its two-year journey.


All in all, the expedition from Saigon to Dali convinced the French that the plan to access China’s “backdoor” via the Mekong was impossible. The difficulties of navigating the Mekong’s rapids were immense, the distance of 3,000 kilometers too long. The plan was eventually dropped. Now we will see if the current scheme of China and Thailand to navigate the Mekong will be any more successful.


The Mekong for Navigation and Tourism


The Mekong can be roughly divided into three parts: the upper stretch, from the Tibetan headwaters to the Golden Triangle; the middle stretch, which runs through the flat terrain from Ubon province, Thailand, to Champasak, Laos; and the lower reaches, which begin where the Khone Falls plunge into Cambodia and end in the Vietnamese delta. The upper stretch of the river surveyed by the French expedition more than a century ago and revisited by us in December 2001 flows through steep gorges and is studded with rapids. We saw about 70 Chinese flat-bottom boats made of iron, mostly carrying pears and apples and cheap Chinese goods ready for “dumping” into Southeast Asian markets. It is an open question how the smaller riparian countries – Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, even Thailand – will fare from this ambitious navigation and trade in comparison with China.


Aside from trade, tourism seems to form the core economic plan of the Mekong countries. “Cultural” and “eco” are popular prefixes that make the industry sound friendly, and the countries involved anticipate quick money. However, I wonder how many tourists, especially those accustomed to the leisure-oriented style of mass tourism, would enjoy such a tough and highly adventurous trip. Our expedition in 2001 took five days. We spent about Bt 31,000 or US$ 670 per person. And I’m not sure we’d want to do it again.


At the other extreme, we heard about a grand tour organized by Diethelm Travel under the nostalgic theme “Expedition Mekong: River of Dreams.” Travel is on the Shanghai-made Hoover Craft, notorious for its noise pollution. The 17-day trip covers 2,620 kilometers, from Jinghong (Chiang Rung) to Saigon – over half the entire length of the Mekong – at a cost of US$ 4,700 (Bt 200,000). At the height of Thailand’s bubble economy in the early- and mid-1990s, a number of Thai businessmen invested heavily in Chiang Saen and Mae Sai. However, many shopping centers and other buildings erected then have been more or less abandoned since the bubble burst in 1997. Who still dreams Bt 200,000 river dreams?


Back in 2001, I brought back as a souvenir a Chinese poster advertising a Lancangjiang-Mekong River Youth Friendship Voyage on a three-storey flat-bottom boat. Chiang Rung, a major city in that area and a stop on the voyage itinerary, had in the old days selectively absorbed interesting outside influences. However, the charming traditional Tai houses there are now giving way to ugly concrete shophouses of urban Chinese style. Han Chinese culture is fast creeping into the city and replacing what was once a bastion of Tai civilization. Kids absorb the latest international fashions, not unlike kids in Bangkok’s Siam Square or Tokyo’s Shinjuku district.


A prime tourist attraction boasted by Chiang Rung are the traditional dances performed by beautiful local maidens. These dances were spectacularly “exotic” to my eyes – a kind of belly-dancing – not unlike a Hollywood farang performing a Thai dance in The King and I, the film banned in Thailand. I must be frank, however. A variation of these spectacular events is already offered in Thailand by our own tourism industry.


The Mekong in the Era of Dam Building and Rapids Blasting


A growing number of academics and NGOs are convinced that conflict over natural resources is one of the most serious problems facing the world. Technology and political power allow some to gain advantage over others in accessing those resources. At one time, Cold War fears of Communism gave the United States the opportunity to become a superpower in this region, replacing French and British imperialists. Development plans on the Mekong River were created in the name of poverty reduction with a simultaneous agenda of eradicating the influence of China and the USSR.


More recently, global “development” giants – the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank – have poured some US$ 40 billion in loans into infrastructure projects such as roads, dams, and power plants in the Mekong region. However, several separate researches and studies undertaken by state agencies and independent organizations confirm the negative social and environmental consequences of these projects, especially the hydro-dams. Communities which depend on the fertility of the Mekong and its tributaries have suffered due to the diminishing bio-diversity of food plants and fish stocks.


Currently, the Mekong is facing two major threats: the blasting away of river rapids for ease of navigation and the construction of massive dams on the Mekong in China. To state planners and project developers, the ongoing “development” is for the well-being of the people in the region (and perhaps also their pockets), but to NGOs and those seeking smaller and more sustainable alternatives, these mega-infrastructure projects mean “damage,” “destruction,” even the “rape” of nature.


In 2000, four Mekong riparian countries – China, Thailand, Laos, and Burma – signed an agreement liberalizing navigation on the Mekong River from Si Mou in China to Luang Phrabang in Laos. Between the Burma-China border demarcation point and Huay Sai in Laos, however, more than 100 rapids were identified as “dangerous” for navigation. The current plan is to eliminate them. But will the economic benefit gained be equal in value to the massive loss in ecology and biodiversity? These rapids are home to hundreds of fish varieties and bird species. Almost all riparian Mekong communities survive by small-scale fishing. The elimination of the rapids may result in changes in the river current and soil erosion. Border lines between Thailand and Laos may even change.


If the rapids are not blasted, would it still be possible for boats to travel up and down the river? The answer is “yes,” if the type and size of boat is matched to river conditions. It is possible for 80-100 ton boats to navigate from China to Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong in Thailand. To reach Luang Phrabang the boats should be reduced to 60 tons. Moreover, roads currently under construction can connect Thailand to Laos and Yunnan as an alternative route. Would such a transport scheme be as “competitive” as a smooth-running, rapids-free Mekong? Probably not, but a narrow calculation of economic costs is not an honest calculation. The alternative approach seeks to factor ecological and economic diversity and sustainability into the equation.


The origin of China’s hydroelectric dam projects on the Mekong lie in the policy shift toward capitalism since the era of Deng Xiao Ping. The first mainstream dam, Man Wan, was completed in 1993. For the 1,500 megawatts of electricity produced by Man Wan, some 25,000 people in ninety-six communities were resettled with no right to debate or dissent. Since the completion of the dam, fishing communities downstream have reported reduced catches. It is the reality of current Chinese politics that none of the concerned communities have the right to participate in decisions made about their future lives and livelihoods.


The third of the ten dams planned, Xiao Wan, is now under construction. Estimated to be as high as a 100-storey building, it is scheduled for completion in 2012. This dam will surely have an effect on the middle 800 kilometers of the Mekong, which flow through the flat Thai-Lao borderlands, and the lower reaches, where the river first forms a delta in Phnom Penh, although it is not yet close to the sea, and in Vietnam, where the vast delta feeds almost the entire population of the southern region of this once war-torn country. What will happen to the water level of the Mekong in the next decade from Chiang Rai to Khong Chiam (Ubon)? In Champasak in southern Laos? In Phnom Penh’s delta and Vietnam’s rice land?


The ultimate question is this – is China destroying the Mekong in the same manner it destroyed the Yangtze River, or Europe destroyed the Danube, or the US destroyed the Mississippi? Moreover, as the Mekong is an international river cutting through six countries, has China consulted the countries downstream before building its dams? The answer is “No.” China seems too mighty to seek consultation with smaller countries. (Or could it be that governments of these countries have been “co-opted” by the Chinese leaders?)


The Mekong in the current era of globalization is facing conflict over natural resources and water. These conflicts may not be as acute as the war for oil we have recently witnessed, but they are like cancers slowly eating into the bones of underprivileged people in the small riparian countries. The new world emerging features not only the United States as global supercop, but China as our neighborhood superpower. And China’s power is likely to spread to mainland Southeast Asia through the Mekong River.


The author is senior adviser to the Southeast Asian Studies Program of Thammasat University, Bangkok. He can be reached at charnvitkasetsiri@yahoo.com

from :Kyoto Review

Democratization in Thailand: Grappling with Realities

Democratization in Thailand: Grappling with Realities
『民主化の虚像と実像－タイ現代政治変動のメカニズム』
Tamada Yoshifumi
玉田芳文
Kyoto / Kyoto University Press / 2003




by Okamoto Masaaki
This review was originally published in Japanese in the Graduate School of Asian and African Studies journal ASAFAS, No. 4 (2004): 136-140. It was translated by Hosoda Naomi.




Dr. Tamada Yoshifumi, a distinguished scholar of modern Thai politics at Kyoto University, was awarded the 20th Masayashi Ohira Memorial Prize in 2004 for this treatment of democratization in Thailand, which the author based on substantive empirical data while carefully avoiding the pitfall of over-theorizing.


The book focuses on the 1990s, when the threat of military coup hung over Thailand. From February 1991, the military began to take a back seat in politics and democratization made definite progress with the emergence of party politics. But by the mid-1990s, there was growing disenchantment with the way party politics was working, and people began advocating for reforms that led eventually to the enactment of the 1997 constitution, considered the most democratic in Thai history. How did this come about?


Thai researchers and public intellectuals generally point to the leading role played by the middle class, particularly beginning with the Phrutsapha Thamin Incident in May 1992. After the March 1992 electoral victory of a coalition of pro-military parties, General Suchinda Khraphrayun, commander-in-chief of the army, broke his promise and became prime minister. This precipitated a massive protest that was met by a military response, resulting in the death or injury of more than 100 persons. The military’s firing on protesters accelerated middle class-led public criticism, which eventually forced the military to withdraw from the political arena. Because of its active role in the protests, the urban middle class has since been regarded as an invaluable actor and promoter of democracy.


This evaluation of the middle class – a change from its estimation as politically marginal in the 1980s – seems to confirm modernization theory’s argument that economic growth expands urban middle classes and lays the groundwork for the expansion of democracy (pp.22-23). But Tamada calls this popular assessment an “unreal portrait” and presents an alternative account of the democratization process.


The book is divided into Part One, on the May 1992 incident, and Part Two, on political reformists and the new constitution. Its seven chapters discuss different views of Thai democratization, the causes and effects of the mass protest rallies of 1992, the decline of military power, the 1997 constitution, the 2000 senatorial election, the 2001 general election, and a conclusion on democratization.


In Tamada’s alternative portrait of democratization, the lead actor in the May Incident is opposition party leader Major General Chamlong Simuang, who successfully mobilized the masses. But since the King blamed the ensuing bloodshed on him and Prime Minister Suchinda, Chamlong’s credibility was eroded and the middle class was able to appropriate both the struggle and the leadership of the reform movement. In this it received tremendous help from the mass media, which overrated the middle class role and annointed it the vanguard of democratization. The middle class went on to support the political reform movement that culminated in the passage of the 1997 “genuine people’s constitution.”


Tamada further argues that the military’s withdrawal from politics was “not due to external factors such as the end of the Cold War, worldwide democratization trends, rapid economic growth followed by collapse and urban middle class pressure, or obscure factors like a change of mind among the soldiers, but rather from personnel issues” (p. 133). He notes that the military’s tough line against the protestors originated with pro-Suchinda officials who saw the preservation of his administration as the best way back to stability. But there was opposition within the army as well, and once pro-Suchinda officials proved unable to maintain the status quo, divisions within the ranks weakened military leadership and undermined the commander-in-chief’s ability to plot another coup.


With the military withdrawing from politics and democratization progressing, the major political rivalry became that between the urban and the rural sector. The urban middle class began to call aggressively for political reform, targeting the local capitalists/party politicians who dominated national politics on the basis of votes from the populous rural areas. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond, with support from the King and the military, had implemented a “controlled transition” to conservative democracy by winning over MPs with development fund allocations, while neutralizing leftist parties. His efforts definitely strengthened political parties: no longer was rhetorical talent sufficient to get elected; financial power became the crucial instrument. Capitalists controlled parties, parties controlled politicians, politicians controlled vote-brokers, and vote-brokers bought votes from the electorate. In this way, the political system gave the upper hand to party politicians and political stability was achieved. Whereas it had previously been said that Bangkok controlled the rural sector and regarded its people as “second-class citizens,” from the 1980s onwards, the balance of power between the two sectors was reversed.


The urban middle class, dissatisfied with this power shift and emboldened by its successful “takeover” of the lead role in the May Incident, began to criticize corruption and call for clean, efficient, and stable government. Middle class activists made up for their numerical deficiency by developing a stronger voice and turned themselves into a “civil force” by mobilizing intellectuals, capitalists, and NGOs. This neutralized the “smaller” voices of the more numerous farmers.


The movement climaxed with the enactment of the 1997 constitution. Despite being known as the “genuine people’s constitution,” it actually favored the minority urban middle class over the majority rural population. The constitution deprived 95 percent of the rural population of eligibility to run for office by stipulating that candidates must have at least a college education. It also favored the election of urban elites through proportional representation and their accession to cabinet seats by practically excluding those elected from single-seat constituencies – the majority of whom come from rural areas.


Tamada thus argues that the portrait of the urban middle class as a supporter of democracy and vanguard of democratization is an “unreal portrait”: this class actually opposed the rural-based democracy of party politicians. The 1997 constitution did not deny democracy outright, however, but rather “consoled” the urban middle class, which might otherwise have turned against democracy altogether. In this way, it did contribute to democratization.


In the 2001 general election, Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai Party won by a landslide. With a stable majority in parliament, Prime Minister Thaksin appointed those elected through the proportional representation system to his cabinet, making leadership less difficult to exercise. He was also able to move around personnel in the bureaucracy and the military, giving him a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis these two state institutions. The regime appeared very stable when this book was written [and has since been re-elected with a greater majority], but Tamada expresses concern that if it weakens, political instability will return. This is the “real image” of contemporary Thai politics that concerns the author.


I would like to add a number of comments from the viewpoint of a non-specialist on Thai politics. First, the author convincingly disproves the popular view of the urban middle class as a promoter of democracy in Thailand in the 1990s. In place of this “unreal portrait,” Tamada asserts the “real image” of a middle class camouflaging itself with democracy in order to usurp the leading role in the 1992 May Incident. It then proceeded to advocate clean, efficient, and stable government and to criticize rural party politicians, a movement culminating in the enactment of the 1997 constitution with its undemocratic elements. This logic is very clear and is backed up by a wealth of data.


The book also characterizes the urban middle class as a passive force against democratization and aims to explain how such passive forces were appeased. But its description of the process leading to the new constitution leaves us with the impression that the middle class was in fact actively and positively pursuing political reform. In this sense, it may be more appropriate to view the urban middle class as a group actively pushing for its own self-interest by exploiting ideological slogans like clean, efficient, and stable government.


Second, the book provides a straightforward and insightful account of some characteristics of Thai politics. Nonetheless, the statement that Thai politicians “could be blunt about [disregarding the demands of] the electorate” (p. 339) requires some explanation. Presumably, it remains imperative for politicians to respond to constituents’ everyday requests and demands, and in fact Thai parliamentarians have funds comparable to the so-called “pork barrel” in the Philippines. Those appointed to the cabinet also have the capacity to return part of their “profits” to their respective constituencies. This is probably a major reason for the high re-election rate of incumbent parliamentarians. When the author writes about a “party politics that could detach itself from the electorate in a way,” he is perhaps referring to the fact that party politicians do not translate the electorate’s demands into policy at the national level.


Third, the book attributes the stability of the Thaksin administration to its successful control of the cabinet, parliament, bureaucracy, and military. The administration also spends money recklessly in the countryside to gain the upper hand there. But how to describe the relationship between the Thaksin administration and the middle class which gave form to the 1997 constitution? If the Thaksin administration was one consequence of that constitution, then surely it has adopted policies favored by the middle class. Moreover, Thaksin the capitalist could be expected to take urban middle class interests into consideration. It would have been interesting if the book gave concrete examples of this. And if the administration did adopt policies favoring the urban middle class, it would no longer be able to treat it as a single entity, because various sectors of the class would offer different levels of support to the administration. In the future, these distinctions may enable other parties pursuing policies different from Thaksin’s to gain ground.


Fourth, the author cites as an urban bias the college education prerequisite for candidacy. It is true that this constitutional provision excludes the great majority of the rural population. However, it may not be a serious issue for local capitalists who can simply buy a diploma. It is the poor, both urban and rural, who are discriminated against by this provision.


Fifth, Tamada begins the book by defining Thai democracy as a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system with competitive and fair elections underpinning regime change; he notes that elected members of parliament, including the prime minister, can become cabinet members (p. 17). This definition is at the core of the book’s argument. My question is whether this is how Thai people define democracy, or whether is based on the author’s deduction. In either case, the author could usefully discuss this definition in greater detail.


Professor Tamada’s book discusses Thai politics of the 1980s and 1990s so thoroughly that it should certainly be read by scholars and researchers interested in the period. What is left for future research in modern Thai politics? One topic is the Thaksin administration; another is the varieties of local or rural political situations that the author alludes to in a separate essay.



Okamoto Masaaki is an assistant professor at CSEAS writing a dissertation on Indonesian politics.

from :Kyoto Review

Mga Suliranin sa Nasyonalistang Historiograpiyang Thai sa Kasalukuyan

Patrick Jory


Mayroong mga panahon kung kailan ang mga diskursong historikal at ang pulitika ng mga ito—sino ang kumokontrol, ang paraan ng pagpapalawig sa mga ito, at kung paano isinusupil ang mga katunggaling kasaysayan—ay napapagitna sa debateng intelektwal o publiko. Sa Thailand, may katagalan na rin mula nang ang kasaysayan ay nagbunga ng ganitong interes. Ang nasyonalistang historiograpiya ay lumilitaw na umabot sa pusisyon ng hegemonya na kapansin-pansin kung hindi dahil sa katotohanang halos wala itong nakahaharap na oposisyon. Gaano katatag, samakatwid, ang pampulitika at pang-akademikong proyektong ito, isang dantaon mula nang ito’y inilunsad?


Sa papel na ito, tinitignan ko ang ilang mga suliranin ng kasalukuyang nasyunalistang historiograpiyang Thai. Ang una ay ang problema ng paksa ng mga naratibong ito, ang bansang Thai. Paano ang naging takbo ng historiograpiya ng bansang Thai, laluna matapos ang critique sa konsepto ng “bayan” na ibinunga noong dekada otsenta ng mga sulatin tulad ng Imagined Communities ni Anderson at The Invention of Tradition nina Hobsbawm at Ranger? Pangalawa, ano ang papel ng monarkiya sa mga naratibong ito? Paano nalilimitahan ng kasalukuyang impluwensyang pulitikal at kultural ng monarkiya ang mga posibilidad ng historiograpiyang Thai? Ang ikatlong problema ay paglalarawan sa mga minoryang etniko at rehiyonal na humahamon sa dati’y simpleng pag-unawa sa isang nagkakaisa, at nag-iisang kulturang bansa.


Isang bagong usapin, lumitaw mula noong rehiyonalisasyon ng dekada nobenta, ay ang epekto ng nasyunalistang historiograpiyang Thai—inilalarawan sa mga dramang pantelebisyon at pelikula, at maging sa mga aklat pang-eskwela—sa relasyon sa mga karatig-bansa ng Thailand na, sa ilang mga pagkakataon, ay humantong sa tensyong diplomatiko. Ang sumusunod na problema ay kaugnay sa mga propesyunal na istoryador sa akademya: ang impluwensya mula dekada nobenta ng teoryang “postmodern” at ang pagkukuwestyon nito sa mga ipinapalagay na katotohanan ng kasaysayan. Kung ang kasaysayang Thai ay isa lamang kwento sa di-mabilang na mga kwento at hindi nakalalamang ang karapatan bilang awtoridad sa nakalipas, karapat-dapat ba rito ang pribilehiyado nitong katayuan? Ang huling suliranin ay ang kasalukuyang kalagayan ng propesyunal na kasaysayan na halos walang kaugnayan sa pagtingin ng madla sa kasaysayan. Paano naapektuhan ng paghina ng disiplina ng kasaysayan sa kanlungang institusyonal—ang mga unibersidad at institusyong pang-edukasyon—ang iniluwal nito isang dantaon na ang nakalilipas, ang kasaysayan ng bansang Thai?


(Translated by Sophia Guillermo.)

from :Kyoto Review

Recent Research on Human Trafficking in Mainland Southeast Asia

Supang Chantavanich


Human trafficking from mainland Southeast Asia in the modern period started in the 1960s in connection with the presence of United States troops in Indochina. The foreign male clients of the sex trade at that time were American soldiers using Thailand as a rest and relaxation area, with some also seeking temporary partners or “rental wives.” After the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina in 1975, some women remained in the sex trade in Thailand, serving male tourists who came on “sex tours.” Others began working abroad, especially in Germany, Scandinavia, Hong Kong, and Japan. Agents facilitated the migration and employment of women through “international human trafficking networks.” A key problem has been the inability of women migrants to anticipate and control the conditions of their labor. “Some women entered the trade willingly. Others were deceived into believing they would have work and/or opportunities abroad unrelated to the sex trade” (Chantavanich et al. 2001:7-8). Further, although some women knew that they would become sex workers, they were not aware of the working conditions they would encounter.


Six recent research reports on human trafficking will be summarized below to illustrate current trends and problems faced by migrants.




The Migration of Thai Women to Germany: Causes, Living Conditions and Impacts for Thailand and Germany
Supang Chantavanich, Suteera Nittayananta, Prapairat Ratanaolan-Mix, Pataya Ruenkaew and Anchalee Khemkrut
Bangkok / Asian Research Center for Migration, Chulalongkorn University / 2001


[This study was conducted in 1997-98; the English version of the report was published in 2001. Findings are mainly from 1997-1998.]


Thai women migrants to Germany draw upon five main sources of assistance in their migration process: friends and immediate relatives; husbands; boyfriends; marriage agencies; and Thai and international employment agents. Women being assisted by their friends and family are less likely to be cheated, and the assistance seems to be much safer than that received from husbands and boyfriends. Unfortunately, many of the women who receive help from sources other than close family or friends are often deceived in some aspects of the migration.


The free flow of Thai women migrants to Germany is enhanced by the lack of efficient control over trafficking within Thailand and internationally, together with lack of government policies to regulate the migration of women who are not laborers. Women migrate for both marriage and for employment, the latter including commercial sex work and other jobs.


Thai women can be decision-makers in the migration process: they understand the implications of their decisions and make them independently. However, some women are also victims of economic and social exploitation. Women therefore often fall partly into two categories: they exercise some decision-making power, but are also exploited and cheated. Those who migrate to Germany for marriage are usually in a stronger decision-making position; the women who migrate for employment often lack information and are deceived from the start.


Until recently, Germany has had relatively relaxed immigration laws which has made it easy for Thai women to enter the country. Recent changes have made the process of migration to Germany much more complex. The costs of migration have also risen, resulting in larger numbers of illegal Thai migrants. In Thailand itself there are few regulatory systems and procedures for administering the migration process, especially for Thais who migrate independently rather than through employment recruitment agencies.




Chinese Women in the Thai Sex Trade
Vorasakdi Mahatdhanobol. Translated by Aaron Stern, edited by Pornpimon Trichot
Bangkok / Chinese Studies Center, Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 1998


Thailand is a major destination for Chinese women both deceived and willingly entering the Thai sex trade. It has been well-known for some time that Thailand has a large commercial sex market and that a variety of services are available. Women are the market’s most important commodity, and Chinese women are one of the market’s offerings. The methods used by underworld groups or gangs to lure women into the sex trade differ little from those used to deceive northern Thai women roughly thirty years ago, when Thailand was in a era similar to China’s current stage of economic change.


The ease with which people can pass across borders creates the opportunity for criminal activity and makes trafficking Chinese women easy, despite differences in language and culture. These same differences make it more difficult for women to flee. It is possible to describe the ways the gangs moved women from place to place:


First, the gangs used one of two methods. Either an intermediary known by the women or a gang member contacted the woman directly. Second, they convinced the woman to leave her home, and third, led her across the border. Fourth, the woman was swapped between the Chinese, Burmese, and Thai gangs, and fifth, the woman was handed over to a person in Thailand before being taken to the sex establishment. The gangs had clear procedures for deceiving and transporting the women.
The gangs had a strong network of people. At each of the different points along the routes used to transport women, the gangs had connections with people of various nationalities. When the women arrived in Thailand, the network was evident from the way they were delivered to the sex establishments. The persons delivering the women knew how many women each establishment desired.
The gangs had a single objective, to deceive Chinese women into the Thai sex trade. The gangs focused on this goal and showed little interest in the women’s appearance or backgrounds. Under the gangs’ practices, there were no detailed conditions for choosing which women to traffic.
Though illegal, the gangs’ activities were very systematic, well-organized, and well-coordinated. Further, they were coordinated horizontally, not vertically, i.e. not conducting their activities as a single organization. If such an organization existed, it had a very loose structure.



“Pitfalls and Problems in the Search for a Better Life: Thai Migrant Workers in Japan”
Phannee Chunjitkaruna
In Thai Migrant Workers in East and Southeast Asia 1996-1997
Supang Chantavanich, Andreas Germershausen, and Allan Beesey, editors
Bangkok / The Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 2000


In 1996-1997, the author found that the prime reason for Thai women to migrate to Japan was to earn fast money in order to have a more comfortable lifestyle. This was a reflection of change in village value systems following the Thai government’s adoption of the western ideology of development and capitalism. Japanese border controls were regarded as a barrier both by Japanese employers and the foreign workers themselves. Therefore in order to enter Japan, Thai workers may have to pose as tourists and overstay their visas. But to guarantee entry, most Thai workers depended on high-cost brokers and the criminal underworld (the Japanese yakuza or the Chinese Snake Head gang).


The smuggling of unskilled foreign workers across borders has become an international business. Brokers and organized crime work closely within transnational networks to arrange each stage of the smuggling operation, from preparing travel documents and taking workers to Japan, to finding them jobs and extracting payment after arrival. Most Thai workers borrow a lot of money from relatives or loan sharks to pay the brokerage fees and, once they arrive in Japan, face years of work to pay off this debt. Some unscrupulous brokers have also seduced and taken Thai women to Japan, where they are detained and forced to work as prostitutes in “snack bars” or brothels. These underworld groups keep the women’s passports and air tickets and watch them at all times so they cannot escape. If the women refuse to cooperate, the yakuza may increase their debt or sell them to a brothel.


Because ordinary Thais are often ignorant of the immigration rules of both Japan and Thailand and the brokers are purely concerned with profit, a considerable number of Thai workers with illegal status have encountered problems in Japan. These include deportation by Japanese authorities, communication difficulties, hospital treatment, exploitation and discrimination by employers or native Japanese, liabilities, fraudulent practice, and poor accommodation.


However, despite the difficulties many illegal Thai workers have coping with life in Japan, they are likely to continue working and living there. The reasons they prolong their stay affirm that their main purpose in coming to Japan was to earn money. Failure to earn enough money to buy consumer goods upon returning to Thailand would be considered a “loss of face” which could be damaging to the social standing of themselves and their families.


Moreover, female Thai workers who have engaged in prostitution find it difficult to go back to their villages since all values have not changed; prostitution is still regarded as shameful. According to these traditional values, “good women” must be virgins before marriage. Thus women who have been employed in the sex industry – whether deliberately or under duress – will usually face criticism from their community and may be unable to marry. Other female workers stay because they wish to marry Japanese men or have children of Japanese nationality in the hope of gaining legal status and social welfare benefits.


But most Thais working in Japan remain to pay off the debt and bondage incurred when they received assistance from the brokers. Initially hoping to earn fast money to pay off their debts and save enough to return to Thailand, many Thai workers chose to put up with demanding work, unfair payment, and no provision of welfare. Consequently, these workers are voluntarily turning themselves into a segregated, marginalized, and discriminated against ethnic group.


In order to continue working and living in Japan, they adapt by using a Japanese name at their workplace and tend to stay inside their apartments for fear of deportation. Simultaneously, they maintain contacts within their ethnic groups and networks as well as their families in Thailand. As a marginalized people in Japan, illegal Thai workers are likely to retain their identity and depend on their ethnic group. Despite the fact that their lives in Japan are tough, they manage by depending on friends, relatives, brokers, the underworld, and NGOs when encountering problems.




Thailand-Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Thailand-Myanmar Border Areas: Trafficking in Children into the Worst Forms of Child Labour. A Rapid Assessment
Christina Wille
Geneva / International Labour Organization / 2001
Read online at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/bangkok/library/pub1.htm


Although trafficking is often considered a single process of transportation from place of origin to place of work, this study found that it occurred in only about one third of the cases. Recruitment directly from a child’s village was most common for girls and Laotians. In the majority of these cases, however, foreign children were recruited for labor exploitation within Thailand after having made separate arrangement to enter the country. It was not uncommon for minors to know about a particular workplace in Thailand and approach an employer or recruiter upon entering the country.


In most cases the minor or minor’s family took the initiative to obtain details on work opportunities outside their village. Fellow villagers and friends were the most common sources of information about particular jobs and general work opportunities, and in the majority of cases minors or their families knew someone who could arrange their transportation and/or recruitment. Parents rarely appeared to be the main driving force behind the decision for a minor to leave for work. In over one-third of the cases, the decision was taken jointly by the parents and child. But the most common decision-making process reported by minors was that they had made the decision to leave on their own; many did not even inform their parents because they expected them to disapprove. Minors expressed a wish to see the world outside their village, and still others left to escape an unhappy or difficult home life or family situation. The majority of the parents of the children had no information or only partial information on their child’s situation.


In cases where the minors arrived in Thailand before they began to work, it was most common for them to arrange the travel themselves. This was particularly common for boys and Laotians. For girls and ethnic minorities, it was more common to be accompanied by a family member who made most of the arrangements. In the less frequent situation, where the minor travelled to Thailand having already been recruited for a particular job, different types of actors organized the transportation. Most commonly these were trusted friends of the family. In almost half of the cases, the transporters were linked to an organized network of transporters, recruiters, and employers. It was less common for these minors to arrange their own transportation or for family members to be the main transporters, and strangers accounted for only about a quarter of the transporters.


In most cases minors were recruited into the worst forms of child labor in the town where the work was located, and most minors made their own way to these localities. Some had been recruited to a particular job before entering Thailand and children recruited at the border site for transportation to work elsewhere in Thailand were rare. The majority of minors had entered the worst forms of child labor within one month of arriving in Thailand. In some cases children had carried out some other kind of work before entering the worst forms of child labor. Some children carried out temporary work in agriculture or helping Thai families with odd jobs such as food preparation, dishwashing, or babysitting.


In over half of the cases where recruitment took place, no profit was made in the transportation or recruitment process. In the small number of case where a profit was made upon the recruitment of a child for work, usually the child became the possession of the employer at least until a certain amount of profit was made. In other cases, the family paid a fee for the transportation and job placement of the child.


Although the majority of the minors believed they had not been tricked or coerced into work, many children said they had only been told part of the truth and half of the children said that they knew almost nothing about the nature of the work they would be doing or the conditions under which they would be working. More specifically, the children reported very low levels of awareness about working hours, working conditions, living conditions, and the degree of freedom they would have while living and working in Thailand.




Small Dreams Beyond Reach: The Lives of Migrant Children and Youth Along the Borders of China, Myanmar and Thailand
Therese M. Caouette
A Participatory Action Research Project of Save the Children (UK) and the UK Department for International Development / 2001
Read online at: http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/labour/small%20dreams%20beyond%20reach.pdf


The majority of cross-border migrants from China and Myanma into Thailand were young, came from rural areas, and had little or no formal education. Along all the borders, young people began migrating on their own at about the age of thirteen. Some children under that age also migrate on their own, though most are accompanied by parents or relatives.


The decision to migrate is complex and usually involves numerous overlapping factors. Children and youth did not give one reason exclusively, but an explanation that included economic survival, war, refuge, government policies, personal problems, and envisioned opportunities abroad. The majority of migrants first explained their move to find work as necessary for their daily survival.


Migrants travelled a number of routes that changed frequently according to their political and economic situation. The vast majority crossed without documentation and even those with travel permits often stayed beyond their expiration or did not abide by the restrictions placed on their visit, with the ultimate result of being identified as illegal immigrants.


Generally, migrants leave their homes not knowing what kind of job they will find abroad and even when they think they know, they often find it is not what they expected. The actual jobs available to migrants were very gender specific. Migrant girls and women sought jobs in factories, shops and restaurants, sex work (direct or indirect), the entertainment industry, or as domestic workers (cleaning and care taking). Male migrants found jobs in the fishing and agricultural industries or as manual day laborers or construction workers.


Though the living and working conditions of cross-border migrants vary according to the place, job, and employer, nearly all study participants noted their vulnerability to exploitation and abuse without protection or redress. The study revealed extensive debt-bondage, sexual abuse, illegal confinement, confiscation of documents, arrest and extortion, forced overtime, few basic resources, and poor accommodations that were overcrowded, insecure, and often violent. Sexual abuse was commonly reported among girls and young women, particularly among those involved in sex work and domestic service.


Trafficking of persons, predominantly children and youth, was common at all sites. The majority of young women and children were trafficked into sex work, marriage, domestic work, or begging. It was found that the majority of girls from migrant communities along the Thai-Myanmar border left their border villages for jobs further inside Thailand. Typically, girls were recruited during the fifth and sixth grade. Trafficking into marriage was also frequently reported by girls and young women from minority communities in Northern Shan State, who often were forced into marriages deeper in China. Many domestic workers from Myanmar also reported being trafficked into domestic work and forced into arrangements and conditions without their knowledge or agreement. Trafficking of young children and babies was reported from Myanmar into China.


Migrants frequently considered their options and opportunities to return home. For many, the decision to return revolved around issues of security and logistics. Discriminatory attitudes towards those who have migrated, especially girls and young women, made the reintegration process extremely difficult, often resulting in further migration.


Though many acknowledge that growing numbers of children and youth migrate with or without their families, there is little awareness of their concerns and needs and extremely few interventions undertaken to reach them.




“Return and Reintegration: Female Migrations from Yunnan to Thailand”
Allan Beesey
In Female Labour Migration in South-East Asia: Change and Continuity
Supang Chantavanich, Christina Wille, Kannika Angsuthanasombat, Maruja MB Asis, Allan Beesey, and Sukamdi, editors
Bangkok / Asian Research Center for Migration, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University / 2001


This study depicts the movement of women from selected villages in one county of Yunnan into Thailand. It shows that many have traveled to Thailand to work wherever there was a demand. The service industry is a major employer, especially the sex industry, although other work is available. Some women have journeyed just to the north of Thailand, an area of traditional trading networks with kin and cultural networks.


There is limited research in Thailand which can track or quantify the movement of Yunnanese into the country. Women in sex work constitute a visible migratory movement which has attracted publicity and some research. This is some evidence that men are migrating as well, but villages in this study area did not provide much evidence of this. Other border villages in other counties and prefectures may provide a different picture.


When the political situation in the area became more stable in the late 1980s, traffickers were quick to take advantage of people wanting to travel to Myanmar and Thailand. The migration of women from the southern prefectures of Yunnan began through traffickers assisting individual women and often cheating or luring them through fake offers. Since the mid-1990s women appear to be making more informed choices. Through their own experience or the experience of others, they are more autonomous and less dependent on traffickers or other assistance, and they may be working in less exploitative working conditions. For some, however, the monetary rewards in compensation for migration are limited, so they may be disappointed. The opportunity to earn a good income has declined since the financial crisis in Thailand. However, if they learn something from the experience, as many say they do, then the monetary rewards are an added bonus or part of the realization of two goals.


It may appear remarkable that since the early 1990’s, trafficking through deception and violence has been transformed into a voluntary movement of women who are often fully aware of the nature of the work they are accepting. Despite the highly stigmatized nature of the occupation, women can rise above the stigma by sharing their earnings and gaining prestige in their village. This shift from trafficking to voluntary movement and to the work gaining acceptability is well documented for northern Thailand. There also appears to be a reduction in negative attitudes toward returning women as it becomes increasingly common in certain villages. This represents a dramatic change since the early 1990s.


Conclusion


Evidence from research on human trafficking and irregular migration in Southeast Asia illustrates some “shift” in the notion of trafficking. The shift can be observed in three aspects of the definition: the nature of recruiters and transporters; the process of trafficking; and exploitation in place of destination.


It is found that there are certain safe recruiters – siblings and close friends – whose service will not result in human trafficking. Those are cases of fortunate predecessors who want their sisters or best friends to have the same opportunities, such as marriage to a good foreign husband or work with a kind employer. The use of force, kidnapping, coercion, and abduction are becoming less common in recruitment. Only trafficked babies are clearly kidnapped. The use of false information about employment, working conditions, and difficult situations which victims may encounter are more frequently identified. Travel agencies and mail-order bride services are a disguised form of recruitment which legally operate internationally. With regard to transporters, they are facilitators for crossborder migrants who want to circumvent restrictive and complicated immigration regulations. Human smuggling is the relevant term for these transporters. The case of human smuggling has become more frequent because many migrants are voluntarily trafficked. In many cases, trafficked persons approach recruiters to seek information about migration. Ethnic minorities are new targets of recruiters and transporters.


There are many steps in the trafficking process, especially if the trafficked person originates in a remote area. It seems that the type of carrier or means of travel is less significant, while the border crossing or passing of immigration control is more important in the transporter’s role. Trafficking networks coordinate horizontally across borders in their operation. The use of fraudulent travel documents is commonly found. Popular destinations for trafficking are locations where immigration control is lax and few migrants disembark.


The nature of exploitative conditions in Southeast Asia differs from that described in the Trafficking Protocol. Apart from slavery or debt bondage and sexual exploitation, trafficked persons encounter illegal confinement, confiscation of documents, arrest and extortion, forced overtime, and poor, overcrowded, insecure, and violent living conditions. Servitude and the removal of human organs are not found. Trafficking of girls and young women into marriage and domestic work are identified, as is that of babies and young children. It is vital to note the increasing cases of women voluntarily and knowingly migrating into the sex trade and becoming revictimized. Identified victims do not want to be assisted and sent back home.


The realities of human trafficking in Southeast Asia indicate new characterizations of the phenomenon. Shifts are reflected in the act of recruitment (from coercion to deception), in the trafficking process (from forced to voluntary and from being approached to approaching recruiters themselves), in the targeted victims (from girls and young women to boys and men too), in transportation (from abduction to facilitation across borders), in the type of recruiters (from professional agents to villagers, distant relatives, and friends), and, finally, in exploitation (from mainly sex work to various worst forms of labor). Such shifts will contribute to redefining the concept of trafficking to reach better characterizations and to confirm that the definition of trafficking can continue to develop into a more inclusive stage.


Supang Chantanivich is founding director of the Asian Research Center for Migration and director of the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University.

from :Kyoto Review